68 research outputs found
Quantum non-malleability and authentication
Abstract: In encryption, non-malleability is a highly desirable property: it ensures that adversaries cannot manipulate the plaintext by acting on the ciphertext. Ambainis et al. gave a definition of non-malleability for the encryption of quantum data. In this work, we show that this definition is too weak, as it allows adversaries to ``inject'' plaintexts of their choice into the ciphertext. We give a new definition of quantum non-malleability which resolves this problem. Our definition is expressed in terms of entropic quantities, considers stronger adversaries, and does not assume secrecy. Rather, we prove that quantum non-malleability implies secrecy; this is in stark contrast to the classical setting, where the two properties are completely independent. For unitary schemes, our notion of non-malleability is equivalent to encryption with a two-design (and hence also to the definition of Ambainis et al.).
Our techniques also yield new results regarding the closely-related task of quantum authentication. We show that ``total authentication'' (a notion recently proposed by Garg et al.) can be satisfied with two-designs, a significant improvement over their eight-design-based construction. We also show that, under a mild adaptation of the rejection procedure, both total authentication and our notion of non-malleability yield quantum authentication as defined by Dupuis et al
Unforgeable Quantum Encryption
We study the problem of encrypting and authenticating quantum data in the
presence of adversaries making adaptive chosen plaintext and chosen ciphertext
queries. Classically, security games use string copying and comparison to
detect adversarial cheating in such scenarios. Quantumly, this approach would
violate no-cloning. We develop new techniques to overcome this problem: we use
entanglement to detect cheating, and rely on recent results for characterizing
quantum encryption schemes. We give definitions for (i.) ciphertext
unforgeability , (ii.) indistinguishability under adaptive chosen-ciphertext
attack, and (iii.) authenticated encryption. The restriction of each definition
to the classical setting is at least as strong as the corresponding classical
notion: (i) implies INT-CTXT, (ii) implies IND-CCA2, and (iii) implies AE. All
of our new notions also imply QIND-CPA privacy. Combining one-time
authentication and classical pseudorandomness, we construct schemes for each of
these new quantum security notions, and provide several separation examples.
Along the way, we also give a new definition of one-time quantum authentication
which, unlike all previous approaches, authenticates ciphertexts rather than
plaintexts.Comment: 22+2 pages, 1 figure. v3: error in the definition of QIND-CCA2 fixed,
some proofs related to QIND-CCA2 clarifie
Can you sign a quantum state?
Cryptography with quantum states exhibits a number of surprising and counterintuitive features. In a 2002 work, Barnum et al. argued informally that these strange features should imply that digital signatures for quantum states are impossible (Barnum et al., FOCS 2002).
In this work, we perform the first rigorous study of the problem of signing quantum states. We first show that the intuition of Barnum et al. was correct, by proving an impossibility result which rules out even very weak forms of signing quantum states. Essentially, we show that any non-trivial combination of correctness and security requirements results in negligible security. This rules out all quantum signature schemes except those which simply measure the state and then sign the outcome using a classical scheme. In other words, only classical signature schemes exist.
We then show a positive result: it is possible to sign quantum states, provided that they are also encrypted with the public key of the intended recipient. Following classical nomenclature, we call this notion quantum signcryption. Classically, signcryption is only interesting if it provides superior efficiency to simultaneous encryption and signing. Our results imply that, quantumly, it is far more interesting: by the laws of quantum mechanics, it is the only signing method available.
We develop security definitions for quantum signcryption, ranging from a simple one-time two-user setting, to a chosen-ciphertext-secure many-time multi-user setting. We also give secure constructions based on post-quantum public-key primitives. Along the way, we show that a natural hybrid method of combining classical and quantum schemes can be used to "upgrade" a secure classical scheme to the fully-quantum setting, in a wide range of cryptographic settings including signcryption, authenticated encryption, and chosen-ciphertext security
Quantum Fully Homomorphic Encryption With Verification
Fully-homomorphic encryption (FHE) enables computation on encrypted data
while maintaining secrecy. Recent research has shown that such schemes exist
even for quantum computation. Given the numerous applications of classical FHE
(zero-knowledge proofs, secure two-party computation, obfuscation, etc.) it is
reasonable to hope that quantum FHE (or QFHE) will lead to many new results in
the quantum setting. However, a crucial ingredient in almost all applications
of FHE is circuit verification. Classically, verification is performed by
checking a transcript of the homomorphic computation. Quantumly, this strategy
is impossible due to no-cloning. This leads to an important open question: can
quantum computations be delegated and verified in a non-interactive manner? In
this work, we answer this question in the affirmative, by constructing a scheme
for QFHE with verification (vQFHE). Our scheme provides authenticated
encryption, and enables arbitrary polynomial-time quantum computations without
the need of interaction between client and server. Verification is almost
entirely classical; for computations that start and end with classical states,
it is completely classical. As a first application, we show how to construct
quantum one-time programs from classical one-time programs and vQFHE.Comment: 30 page
Quantum fully homomorphic encryption with verification
Fully-homomorphic encryption (FHE) enables computation on encrypted data while maintaining secrecy. Recent research has shown that such schemes exist even for quantum computation. Given the numerous applications of classical FHE (zero-knowledge proofs, secure two-party computation, obfuscation, etc.) it is reasonable to hope that quantum FHE (or QFHE) will lead to many new results in the quantum setting. However, a crucial ingredient in almost all applications of FHE is circuit verification. Classically, verification is performed by checking a transcript of the homomorphic computation. Quantumly, this strategy is impossible due to no-cloning. This leads to an important open question: can quantum computations be delegated and verified in a non-interactive manner? In this work, we answer this question in the affirmative, by constructing a scheme for QFHE with verification (vQFHE). Our scheme provides authenticated encryption, and enables arbitrary polynomial-time quantum computations without the need of interaction between client and server. Verification is almost entirely classical; for computations that start and end with classical states, it is completely classical. As a first application, we show how to construct quantum one-time programs from classical one-time programs and vQFHE
Quantum-secure message authentication via blind-unforgeability
Formulating and designing unforgeable authentication of classical messages in the presence of quantum adversaries has been a challenge, as the familiar classical notions of unforgeability do not directly translate into meaningful notions in the quantum setting. A particular difficulty is how to fairly capture the notion of "predicting an unqueried value" when the adversary can query in quantum superposition. In this work, we uncover serious shortcomings in existing approaches, and propose a new definition. We then support its viability by a number of constructions and characterizations. Specifically, we demonstrate a function wh
On non-adaptive quantum chosen-ciphertext attacks and Learning with Errors
Large-scale quantum computing is a significant threat to classical public-key cryptography. In strong “quantum access” security models, numerous symmetric-key cryptosystems are also vulnerable. We consider classical encryption in a model which grants the adversary quantum oracle access to encryption and decryption, but where the latter is restricted to non-adaptive (i.e., pre-challenge) queries only. We define this model formally using appropriate notions of
On quantum chosen-ciphertext attacks and learning with errors
Quantum computing is a significant threat to classical public-key cryptography. In strong “quantum access” security models, numerous symmetric-key cryptosystems are also vulnerable. We consider classical encryption in a model which grants the adversary quantum oracle access to encryption and decryption, but where the latter is restricted to non-adaptive (i.e., pre-challenge) queries only. We define this model formally using appropriate notions of ciphertext indistinguishability and semantic security (which are equivalent by standard arguments) and call it QCCA1 in analogy to the classical CCA1 security model. Using a bound on quantum random-access codes, we show that the standard PRF-based encryption schemes are QCCA1-secure when instantiated with quantum-secure primitives. We then revisit standard IND-CPA-secure Learning with Errors (LWE) encryption and show that leaking just one quantum decryption query (and no other queries or leakage of any kind) allows the adversary to recover the full secret key with constant success probability. In the classical setting, by contrast, recovering the key requires a linear number of decryption queries. The algorithm at the core of our attack is a (large-modulus version of) the well-known Bernstein-Vazirani algorithm. We emphasize that our results should not be interpreted as a weakness of these cryptosystems in their stated security setting (i.e., post-quantum chosen-plaintext secrecy). Rather, our results mean that, if these cryptosystems are exposed to chosen-ciphertext attacks (e.g., as a result of deployment in an inappropriate real-world setting) then quantum attacks are even more devastating than classical ones
Approximating Turaev-Viro 3-manifold invariants is universal for quantum computation
The Turaev-Viro invariants are scalar topological invariants of compact,
orientable 3-manifolds. We give a quantum algorithm for additively
approximating Turaev-Viro invariants of a manifold presented by a Heegaard
splitting. The algorithm is motivated by the relationship between topological
quantum computers and (2+1)-D topological quantum field theories. Its accuracy
is shown to be nontrivial, as the same algorithm, after efficient classical
preprocessing, can solve any problem efficiently decidable by a quantum
computer. Thus approximating certain Turaev-Viro invariants of manifolds
presented by Heegaard splittings is a universal problem for quantum
computation. This establishes a novel relation between the task of
distinguishing non-homeomorphic 3-manifolds and the power of a general quantum
computer.Comment: 4 pages, 3 figure
Decoherent quantum walks driven by a generic coin operation
We consider the effect of different unitary noise mechanisms on the evolution
of a quantum walk (QW) on a linear chain with a generic coin operation: (i)
bit-flip channel noise, restricted to the coin subspace of the QW, and (ii)
topological noise caused by randomly broken links in the linear chain.
Similarities and differences in the respective decoherent dynamics of the
walker as a function of the probability per unit time of a decoherent event
taking place are discussed
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